The “Big Three” conference at Yalta in February 1945 ended in disagreement on the post-war treatment of Germany and the post-war fate of Poland.
Stalin’s Broken Promises
There was no consensus over the dismembering of Germany into five small states, or the level of reparations the Germans should pay or the procedures for dealing with war criminals.
“The only bond of the victors is their common hate,” Winston told Anthony Eden, his War Minister. Winston greatly feared that the desire for revenge might dominate post-war policy in Europe.
There was no hope of agreement, either, on the subject of Poland. By the time the Yalta Conference took place, the Soviet Army had gained control of Poland and a large part of eastern Europe. Stalin could now do as he pleased in these conquered territories.
Although Stalin did promise Winston that the Poles could have free and fair elections within a month, he did not keep his word In fact, every promise the Soviet leader made at Yalta concerning Poland was afterwards broken.
Last Meeting with Roosevelt
Winston returned home for England via Alexandria, where the USS Quincy, with President Roosevelt on board, was berthed on its way back to the United State. Roosevelt , exhausted by the strain of the Yalta Conference, seemed to be fading fast.
“I felt he had a slender contact with life,” Winston later recalled. “At Yalta ...his captivating smile, his gay and charming manner, had not deserted him, but his face had a transparency, an air of purification and often there was a faraway look in his eyes.
“ When I took my leave of him in Alexandria harbor, I must confess that I had an indefinable sense of fear that his health and his strength were on the ebb.” Winston and Roosevelt never saw each other again.
The Fate of Romania and Poland
The British Prime Minister reached home on February 19, after an absence of tree weeks. Decisions made at the Yalta Conference regarding the fate of Poland had stirred up controversy.
Many members of Parliament found it impossible to believe Stalin’s assurance of free elections. Winston was guardedly hopeful when he wrote: “Personally, in spite of my anti-Communist convictions, I have good hopes that Russia, or at any rate Stalin, desires to work in harmony with the Western democracies. The alternative would be despair about the long term future of the world.”
It was a front. Behind it, Winston was depressed by a somber comparison. Here he was, trusting Stalin to keep his word and yet in both 1938 and 1939, another British Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, had trusted and been betrayed by another dictator, Adolf Hitler.
News of Stalin’s betrayal reached Winston in the next weeks. Reports told of political thuggery in Romania, where the Russians were using intimidation, backed by military force, to impose a communist government. In Poland, non-communists were excluded from government. Political opposition was banned. Some two thousand priests, intellectuals and teachers were sent to Russian labor camps.
In March 1945, Winston sent a telegram to President Roosevelt urging him to exert “dogged pressure and persistence” in the cause of preserving Polish freedom. There was no response. By this time, Roosevelt’s rapidly failing health had ensured that he was past all exertions.
Eisenhower’s New Plan
At the end of March, soon after he returned from an extensive tour of the battlefront along the River Rhine, Winston’s attention was diverted by another problem. General Eisenhower had decided on a change of plan for the campaign in Germany: he wanted to abandon the drive for Berlin for the sake of a more southerly advance through Leipzig to Dresden, moving as far as, but no beyond, the River Elbe.
Eisenhower was not convinced of the importance of Berlin, either as an industrial target or a military center. His plan focused instead on overcoming resistance the Germans were putting up in the industrial cities of the south.
Winston and the British chiefs of staff were thoroughly alarmed when they received the news. To them, Eisenhower’s plan was a terrible strategic. Not only would it allow the Russians to seize Berlin, but halting American troops at the river Elbe would give them access to even more territory in the easy and could even threaten the Austrian capital, Vienna.
Winston used all possible persuasions to make Eisenhower change his mind. “I deem it highly important,” he cabled the American general “gthat we should shake hands with the Russians as far east as possible.”
Eisenhower was unmoved. His new plan went forward and on April 11, his forces reached the Elbe. Berlin was less than seventy miles distant, but the American troops made no sign of advancing towards it.
Winston interpreted the situation in the grimmest terms. “It is by no means certain,” he declared “that we could count on Russia as a beneficent influence in Europe or as a willing partner in maintaining the peace of the world. Yet, at the end of the war, Russia will be left in a position of preponderant power and influence throughout the whole of Europe.”
The Death of Roosevelt
On April 12, President Roosevelt died, shortly after suffering a stroke. leaving Winston deeply distressed.
The Prime Minister paid tribute to the President on April 17, the day of his funeral. “My friendship with the great man to whose work and fame we pay our tribute today began and ripened during the war,” Winston told the House of Commons.
” ...I conceived an admiration for him as a statesman, a man of affairs and a war leader. I felt the utmost confidence in his upright, inspiring character and outlook, and a personal regard affection....for him beyond my power to express today."
“It remains only to say that in Franklin Roosevelt there died the greatest American friend we have ever known and the greatest champion of freedom who has ever brought help and comfort from the New World to the Old.”
Sources
Ferrell, Robert H: The Dying President: Franklin D. Roosevelt, 1944-1945 (Columbia, Missouri: University of Missouri Press, 1998)
ISBN-10: 0826211712/ISBN-13: 978-0826211712
Kershaw, Ian: The End: The Defiance and Destruction of Hitler's Germany, 1944-1945 (New York, NY: Penguin Press HC, 2011)
ISBN-10: 1594203148/ISBN-13: 978-1594203145
The establishment and control of the Soviet satellite states